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Abstract 
This study analyzes the returns to target stockholders for partially acquired firms 
surrounding the acquisition announcements through one year after the announcements. A 
sample of fifty-three Canadian firms partially acquired by domestic firms from 1993 
through 1999 is considered. The examination of the return behaviour found significant 
positive abnormal returns from event-day t = - 2 through t = + 1. No significant abnormal 
returns are realized thereafter. The findings imply that the announcements positively 
affect the surrounding returns. The lack of significant positive abnormal returns thereafter 
suggests that the announcement does not have a positive impact on the stockholder 
returns one year later.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 In order to compete more effectively in an increasingly competitive and integrated 
world economy, corporations merge, acquire, divest and restructure various business 
activities as part of the re-configuration of their competitive advantage. 
Over the last 20 years, acquisitions activity has been one of the chief methods for 
organizational growth. Whether the goal is improving margins, increasing market share 
or raising shareholder value, growth is critical. Despite the fact that acquisition success 
rates are deplorably low, corporations have turned increasingly to acquisitions to fuel 
their future success. The chief rationalizations offered for taking such a risky strategy are: 
attempts at organic growth often take too long to achieve greater market share; 
investment in research and development has proved unfruitful or too expensive; the 
corporations have identified targets of unique opportunity, or simply they expect to 
succeed where others have failed (Lynch and Lind, 2002).  
Financial economists contend that acquisitions are one part of a market driven 
mechanism by which resources are reallocated from lower-valued to alternative, higher-
valued uses. The process supplements the prevailing competitive forces in markets, in 
which firms purchase inputs and sell outputs, and stimulates these firms to adapt to 
changing demands, to respond rapidly to evolving technologies, and to adjust to 
fluctuating capital market conditions. Most importantly, the market for corporate control 
of publicly traded corporations unsettles comfortable managerial lives, minimizes the 
principal-agent problem between shareholders and inefficient or shirking management 
and eliminates obsolete and less productive processes and organizational structures. 
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Motives behind Acquisition Activity 
 Several motives have been offered to explain why acquisition activity takes place. 
Some of the motives are explained below. 
Improved management hypothesis. Some takeovers are motivated by a belief that 
the acquiring firm’s management can better manage the target’s resources. The bidder 
may feel that its management skills are such that the value of the target would rise under 
its control. This leads the acquirer to pay a value for the target in excess of the target’s 
current stock price.   
   The improved management argument may have particular validity in cases of 
large companies making offers for smaller, growing companies. The smaller companies, 
often led by entrepreneurs, may offer a unique product or service that has sold well and 
facilitated the rapid growth of the target.  
          The growing enterprise may find that it needs to oversee a much larger distribution 
network and may have to adopt a very different marketing philosophy. Many of the 
decisions that a larger firm has to make require a different set of managerial skills than 
those that resulted in the dramatic growth of the smaller company. The lack of 
managerial expertise may be a stumbling block in the growing company and may limit its 
ability to compete in the broader marketplace. These managerial resources are an asset 
that the larger firm can offer the target firm (Gaughan, 1996). 
Tax motives. Tax gains can be important motives for certain takeovers. A target 
can become more valuable, for example, if it has transferable tax losses that an acquirer 
can use to offset income. Other sources of gains can be investment tax credits, which can 
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also be used to offset income. Moreover, whether the transaction can be structured as a 
tax-free exchange can be a prime determining factor in whether to go forward with a deal 
(Gaughan, 1996). 
Synergy. The term synergy is often associated with the physical sciences rather 
than with economics or finance. It refers to the type of reactions that occur when two 
substances or factors combine to produce a greater effect together than what the sum of 
the two operating independently could account for. For example, a synergistic reaction 
occurs in chemistry when two chemicals combine to produce a more potent total reaction 
than the sum of their separate effects. Simply stated, synergy refers to the phenomenon of 
2 + 2 = 5. In acquisitions, this translates into the ability of a corporate combination to be 
more profitable than the individual profits of the firms that were combined        
(Gaughan, 1996).   
The anticipated existence of synergistic benefits allows firms to incur the 
expenses of the acquisition process and still be able to afford to give target shareholders a 
premium for their shares. Synergy may allow the combined firm to appear to have a 
positive net acquisition value (NAV).                                                                                                           
Diversification. By expanding through acquisition of other firms, the acquiring 
corporation may attempt to achieve some of the benefits that investors receive by 
diversifying their portfolio of assets. The portfolio theory research literature in finance 
has attempted to quantify some of the risk-reduction benefits that an investor may enjoy 
through diversification. This research clearly supports the intuitive belief of investors that 
“putting all one’s eggs in one basket” is not a wise decision (Gaughan, 1996). 
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Economic motives. Combinations that result in an increase in market share may 
have a significant impact on the combined firm’s market power. Market power, which is 
sometimes also referred to as monopoly power, is defined as the ability to set and 
maintain price above competitive levels. Since in the long run sellers in a competitive 
industry only earn a normal return and do not earn “economic rent,” competitive firms set 
price equal to marginal cost. Market power refers to the ability to set price in excess of 
marginal cost (Gaughan, 1996). 
Hubris hypothesis of takeovers. An interesting hypothesis regarding takeover 
motives has been proposed by Roll (1986). He considers the role that hubris, or 
exaggerated self-confidence of the managers in the acquiring firm, may play in 
explaining takeovers. The hubris hypothesis implies that chief executive officers (CEOs) 
seek to acquire firms for their own personal motives and that the pure economic gains to 
the acquiring firm are not the sole or even the primary motivation in the acquisition. 
Roll uses this hypothesis to explain why managers might pay a premium for a 
firm that the market has already correctly valued. Managers, he states, have 
superimposed their own valuation over that of an objectively determined market 
valuation. Roll’s position is that the pride of management allows them to believe that 
their valuation is superior to that of the market. 
The famed investor, Warren Buffett, once said that many corporate acquirers 
think of themselves as beautiful princesses, sure that their kisses can turn toads into 
handsome princes. The acquirers pay substantial premiums over market value, believing 
that they can release the imprisoned princes. But, as Buffett said, “We’ve observed many 
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kisses but very few miracles” (1981 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report as cited in 
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). With acquirers making record numbers of takeovers at 
prices far above market levels, the comment Buffett made in 1981 has not lost its 
relevance for managers and students of organizations today. In fact, more acquisitions 
were announced in 1995 in U.S. than in any prior calendar year (Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997). And between 1976 and 1990, 35,000 corporate acquisitions were completed in 
U.S., with a combined value of $ 2.6 trillion (Jensen, 1993). Yet, for all this activity, 
executives of acquiring companies generally fail to effect acquisition miracles. 
Acquisitions sometimes yield positive returns for acquirers (Lubatkin, 1987), but 
generally acquisitions have been found to have a neutral to negative effect on the 
shareholder wealth of acquiring firms (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Bradley, Desai, & 
Kim, 1988; Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, 1988). Commonly, investors mark down the stock 
of acquirers following takeovers announcements, indicating their belief that acquiring 
managers have overpaid (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). This adverse market reaction is 
reinforced by findings that acquisitions lead to declines in the acquirer’s longer-term 
profitability (Fowler & Schmidt, 1988; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) and shareholder 
returns (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelkar, 1992). Acquisitions are often resold later at a loss 
(Porter, 1987). 
Background of the Problem 
Canada is not an exception when it comes to this wave of acquisition activity. 
Dramatic takeovers have become commonplace and debate about them fills the popular 
and business press. For example, in 1993 the number of merger and acquisition 
announcements was 895. In 1999, the number of announcements of mergers and 
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acquisitions reached 1,230. This represents a 37.43 percent increase within the period.  
The dollar value of the mergers and acquisitions announcements in 1993 was $35 billion, 
whereas in the year 1999 it was $178 billion. 
Financial researchers argue that the goal of the publicly held firm should be to 
maximize the value of the common stock and that this value maximization rule is 
unanimously supported by all financial claimants under a variety of conditions (e.g., 
Ekern & Wilson, 1974; Nielsen, 1976). Profitability or wealth maximization is not only a 
management goal; it is often the primary reason for organizational existence (Taylor, 
2002). 
Management literature amply reported the discouraging results of many 
acquisitions. There have been widespread warnings of the erosion of shareholder value 
and the serious socio-economic costs associated with many acquisitions. In an excellent 
summary article "Do deals deliver on post merger performance?" (Note: mergers and 
acquisitions used synonymously) Alexandra Reed Lajoux and J. Fred Weston (as cited in 
Lynch and Lind, 2002), argue that the longer-term effects of mergers show impairment of 
value (measured by share price and other indicators) for a variety of identifiable reasons, 
including inexperience, lack of strategic purpose, use of overvalued stock as a payment 
mode, and poor post-merger integration. The research, they argue, also shows that 
companies avoiding these traps perform better than their peers, both acquiring and non-
acquiring.  
The acquisition wave has also resulted in some firms investing in other firms by 
buying a certain percent of shares, but less than 100 percent, making them part owners in 
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such firms. These investing firms have found it strategic not to fully acquire these firms. 
This raises the related question. How do partial acquisitions affect target firms?  
The Research Statement 
This study undertakes an investigation of Canadian firms partially acquired by 
domestic firms. The research statement is: The Effects of Partial Acquisition on Stock 
Performance of Target Firms. 
The Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research study is to investigate how a partial acquisition 
affects the stock price performance of a target firm.  
The Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To investigate the returns to target shareholders surrounding the partial acquisition 
announcements dates. 
2. To investigate the stock performance of target firms one year subsequent to the 
partial acquisition. 
Significance of the Study 
Studies, mostly from the U.S., have analyzed the impact of acquisitions on 
management turnovers and post merger/acquisition performance of the acquiring firms. 
The existing literature, however, on partial acquisition is limited. This study is important 
because not only will it contribute to the body of literature on acquisition activity, but it 
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also anticipated that it will shed some light on how partial acquisitions affect the stock 
performance of target firms, more specifically, the shareholder values. 
Literature Review 
Market for Corporate Control 
In the early 1960s, academics coined the phrase “market for corporate control” to 
describe the market for buying and selling companies, as opposed to the market for 
products and services. This market for control over companies, their assets, and the 
opportunity to generate value from them has been very active, to say the least. The pace 
of acquisition seems unrelenting. In 1988, according to Fortune magazine (as cited in 
Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 1990), the top fifty deals in the U.S. totaled $ 111.8 billion, 
a new record. This booming market occurred despite the stock market crash in late 1987, 
which might have scared off potential acquirers, especially heavily leveraged ones.                                  
While at any given time different explanations can be offered for acquisition 
activity, ranging from rising stock prices to a “cheap” dollar, more fundamental forces 
are usually at work. Currently they suggest that a relatively high level of activity in the 
market for corporate control will persist. Three of the most important forces are described 
next.  
Changes in capital markets. The capital markets have changed dramatically, to 
the point where enormous volumes of funds are available to back acquisitions. 
Institutional money has flooded into leveraged-buyout funds in search of high returns. 
The high yield-bond market is large and active. Banks are eager to finance acquisitions 
since they earn high fees and spreads on this business at a time when many of their other, 
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more traditional activities are marginally profitable at best. Foreign banks are eager to 
crack markets (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 1990). 
Shareholder activism. At the same that funding for takeovers has become more 
available, shareholders are becoming impatient with managements who do not focus on 
value creation--and they are doing something about it. Even though a legal fiction has 
always existed that shareholders are owners of corporations, the reality was quite 
different, until recently. If a shareholder did not like the performance of a company, he or 
she was wasting time attending its annual shareholders’ meeting. Stock owners basically 
voted with their feet, selling their shares rather than getting involved in proxy battles at 
the annual meeting. In fact, shareholders were such a docile lot that those who did make 
proposals to be voted on at the annual meeting were treated like errant children or labeled 
gadflies (Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 1990). 
That is changing dramatically. Not only has the proportion of stock owned by 
large investors grown rapidly, but investors are also increasingly ready to intervene 
directly when management is underperforming. Funds managers who are evaluated 
annually on the basis of the amount by which their investment returns exceed the 
performance of the market, face enormous pressures. Consequently, they are more 
willing to have their voices heard if they disagree with management’s actions and 
performance. 
Ineffective takeover defenses. Obviously, the wave of takeovers and 
restructurings have not gone unnoticed by corporate managements and other groups. In 
an effort to fend off unwanted suitors, managements and their advisors have developed a 
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wide range of defensive mechanisms. These include supermajority provisions, staggered 
boards, and poison pills. In addition, “antiraider” statutes aimed at protecting companies 
against hostile takeovers have been adopted in some parts of U.S. Not surprisingly, these 
steps have generated intense controversy and even greater demand for legal talent with 
expertise in acquisitions. They have succeeded in preventing the more questionable--and 
one could argue abusive--tactics, especially the two-tier, front-end-loaded takeover 
(Copeland, Koller, & Murrin, 1990). 
What these steps have not succeeded in doing is stopping the determined bidder. 
Most investment bankers and lawyers seem to agree that no permanent defense can be 
made against a well-financed, all-cash bid that exceeds the next-best offer on the table. 
Poison pills have a spotty track record when put to the test in the courts. Restrictive 
statutes are being challenged vigorously and successfully by well-heeled bidders. High 
bids that attract a substantial majority of outstanding shares in tender offers are often not 
subject to the restrictive provisions in statutes, anyway. Additionally, proxy contests can 
be used as an alternative avenue of attack to overcome blockages put in place by sitting 
directors, ultimately by removing the directors or calling special shareholders’ meetings 
to amend the bylaws directly. And federal government has taken a more laissez-faire 
attitude toward antitrust enforcement, so that once-potent deterrent has been weakened. 
Legal maneuvers and obstacles certainly make takeovers more expensive and time-
consuming, but they do not stop them. 
In this market for corporate control, acquisition activity takes place to replace 
inefficient management that fails to maximize firm value [see, for example, Choi (1993), 
Copeland, Koller, & Murrin (1990), Dahya & Powell (1998), Ikenberry & Lakonishok 
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(1993), Martin & McConnel (1991), and Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny (1989)]. Most of the 
literature regarding acquisitions and the impact on management has come from the U.S. 
The studies of Agrawal and Walking (1994), Denis and Denis (1995), and Martin and 
McConnell (1991) provide strong support for the takeovers being of a disciplinary nature. 
These studies report poor pre-bid performance and high top management turnover once 
the takeover has been completed. Walsh and Ellwood (1991) study the relationship 
between pre-merger performance of the target and post-acquisition turnover of top 
management. The findings show a turnover of 61% for target management and 34% for 
the non-acquired control sample. Dahya and Powell (1998) find in a sample of 92 target 
firms; 47 percent experienced a change in the top executive category following a 
successful takeover. Kennedy and Limmack (1996) find a significant increase in the rate 
of target firm CEO turnover following the takeover. They argue that most of these CEOs 
are from firms with poor pre-bid price performance. This supports the theory that 
takeovers act as a disciplinary mechanism on non-wealth maximizing CEOs. Likewise, a 
partial acquisition takes place to give an initial warning to target management and to 
directly place a monitoring mechanism through which the behaviour of the target 
managers can be controlled.  
Board of Directors as a Mechanism of Managerial Control 
The separation of ownership and control first discussed by Berle and Means 
(1932) creates many situations in which the interests of managers and owners may not 
coincide. For example, in the last ten years, a considerable amount of evidence has 
documented the prevalence of managerial behaviour that does not serve the interests of 
investors, particularly shareholders. Most of this evidence comes from the capital market 
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in the form of “event” studies. The idea is that if the stock price falls when managers 
announce a particular action, then this action must serve the interests of managers rather 
than those of the shareholders. While in some circumstances this inference is not justified 
because the managerial action, while serving the interests of shareholders, inadvertently 
conveys to the market some unrelated bad news about the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986a), in general such event study analysis is fairly compelling. It has surely become the 
most common empirical methodology of corporate governance and finance [see, Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, & Roll (1969) for the first event study]. 
In his free cash flow theory, Jensen (1986) argues that managers choose to 
reinvest the free cash rather than return it to investors. Jensen uses the example of the oil 
industry, where in the mid-1980s integrated oil producers spent roughly $ 20 per barrel to 
explore for new oil reserves (and thus maintain their oil exploration activities), rather 
than return their profits to shareholders or even buy proven oil reserves that sold in the 
marketplace for around $ 6 per barrel. McConnell and Muscarella (1986) look more 
generally at announcement effects of investment projects of oil and other firms, and find 
negative returns on such announcements in the oil industry, although not in others. The 
study of investment announcements is complicated by the fact that managers in general 
are not obligated to make such announcements, and hence those that they do make are 
likely to be better news than the average one. Still, the managers in the oil industry 
announce even the bad news. 
The announcement selection problem does not arise in the case of a particular 
kind of investment, namely acquisitions, since almost all acquisitions of public 
companies are publicly announced. Some of the clearest evidence on agency problems 
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therefore comes from acquisition announcements. Many studies show that bidder returns 
on the announcement of acquisitions are often negative [Roll (1986) surveys this 
evidence]. Finally, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find that bidder returns are the 
lowest among firms with low Tobin’s Qs and high cash flows. Their result supports 
Jensen’s (1986) version of agency theory, in which the worst agency problems occur in 
firms with poor investment opportunities and excess cash. In sum, quite a bit of evidence 
points to the dominance of managerial rather than shareholder motives in firms’ 
acquisition decisions. 
Even clearer evidence of agency problems is revealed by the studies that focus on 
managers directly threatened with the loss of private benefits of control. These are the 
studies of management resistance to takeovers, which are now too numerous to survey 
completely. Managerial resistance to value-increasing takeovers is less likely when top 
managers have a direct financial interest in the deal going through via share ownership or 
golden parachutes, or when top managers are more likely to keep their jobs. Another set 
of studies finds that, when managers take anti-takeover actions, shareholders lose. For 
example, DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find that public 
announcements of certain anti-takeover amendments to corporate charters, such as super-
majority provisions requiring more than 50 percent of the votes to change corporate 
boards, reduce shareholder wealth. Ryngaert (1988) and Malatesta and Walkling (1988) 
find that, for firms who have experienced challenges to management control, the adoption 
of poison pills--which are devices to make takeovers extremely costly without target 
management’s consent--also reduce shareholder wealth. Comment and Schwert (1995), 
however, question the event study evidence given the higher frequency of takeovers 
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among firms with poison pills in place. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that 
managers resist takeovers to protect their private benefits of control rather than to serve 
shareholders. 
Some of the evidence on agency costs is less direct, but perhaps as compelling. In 
one of the most macabre event studies ever performed, Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and 
Newman (1985) find that sudden executive deaths--in plane crashes or from heart 
attacks--are often accompanied by increases in share prices of the companies these 
executives managed. The price increases are the largest for some major conglomerates, 
whose founders built vast empires without returning much to investors. A plausible 
interpretation of this evidence is that the flow of benefits of control diminishes after the 
deaths of powerful managers. 
There is also a great deal of evidence that control is valued, which would not be 
the case if controlling managers (or shareholders) received the same benefits as the other 
investors. Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992) find that, in the U.S., large blocks of 
equity trade at a substantial premium to the post-trade price of minority shares, indicating 
that the buyers of the blocks that may have a controlling influence receive special 
benefits. Several studies compare the prices of shares with identical dividend rights, but 
differential voting rights. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), and Lease, McConnell, and 
Mikkelson (1983, 1984), all show that, in the U.S., shares with superior voting rights 
trade at a premium. On average, this premium is very small, but it rises sharply in 
situations where control over firms is contested, indicating yet again that controlling 
management teams earn benefits that are not available to minority investors. 
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Agency theory is based on the notion that the delegation of managerial 
responsibilities by principals (owners) to agents (managers) requires the presence of 
mechanisms that either align the interests of principals and agents (such as stock 
ownership plans and performance contingent compensation) or monitor the performance 
of managers to ensure that they use their knowledge and the firm's resources to generate 
the highest possible return for principals. A better solution is to grant a manager a highly 
contingent, long-term incentive contract ex ante to align his or her interests with those of 
investors. While in some future contingencies the marginal value of the personal benefits 
of control may exceed the marginal value of the manager’s contingent compensation, 
such instances will be relatively rare if the incentive component of pay is substantial. In 
this way, incentive contracts can induce the manager to act in investors’ interests without 
encouraging blackmail. When the optimal compensation contract cannot be achieved or 
managers are reluctant to bear greater risks, owners must create or utilize existing 
mechanisms to monitor managerial action (Fama, 1980).  
The primary monitoring mechanism available to organizational owners is the 
board of directors. The board of directors is considered an important internal corporate 
control mechanism (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). A number of authors have 
supported this reasoning, for example, Boyd (1994) and Zald (1969), who argue that the 
board of directors is probably the most effective mechanism for both influencing and 
controlling top management decisions so as to ensure that shareholder interests are 
protected. In short, the board helps align ownership interests with top management and 
hence performs the monitoring that shareholders expect (Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
Among other things, the directors are responsible for evaluating the chief executive 
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officer (CEO) and other top-executives, determining the level and structure of top-
executive compensation, and replacing poorly performing CEOs.  
To perform this function effectively, the board of directors must assume the task 
of extracting information about the true managerial performance of the firm from noisy 
and sometimes disguised or misleading financial performance measures. Both accounting 
and market-based measures are likely to be relatively useful indicators, though both of 
these measures may be determined in part by factors beyond the control of the firm's 
managers, such as, industry and economy factors. Furthermore, these measures are likely 
to be prone to the influence of managerial inputs and outputs, which themselves may 
provide indicative information on managerial performance (Joskow & Rose, as cited in 
Dahya & Powell, 1998). In the U.S. and the U.K., managerial performance is maintained 
(and agency problems limited) by the complementary intervention of both internal and 
external control mechanisms (Franks & Mayer, 1996). These mechanisms include: (1) 
monitoring and exerting an influence on control through the team of executive and non-
executive directors on the board (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Weisbach, 1988); (2) the 
managerial labour market (Fama, 1980); (3) product market competition (Hart, as cited in 
Dahya & Powell, 1998); and (4) the market for corporate control (Jensen, as cited in 
Dahya & Powell, 1998).  
The Failure of Internal Control Mechanisms 
The internal control mechanisms of corporations operate through the board of 
directors, who generally maintain the power to hire and fire top management. There is, 
however, considerable controversy about the role of the board of directors in this 
governance process. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Fama (1980) view the board as an 
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important internal mechanism for disciplining incumbent management. Mace (1986), 
however, questions the importance of the board and non-executive directors as monitors.  
The importance of internal control mechanisms has increased in the U.S., due 
partially to legal and regulatory developments, which have curtailed activity in the 
market for corporate control (see, Jensen 1991). Furthermore, in the U.K., a re-emphasis 
on the importance of good internal management controls followed the publication of the 
Cadbury Report (1992) (as cited in Dahya & Powell, 1998) on corporate governance. 
There is, however, little empirical evidence on the effectiveness of internal control 
mechanisms in generating improvements in firm performance. Denis and Denis (1995) 
note that, if internal control mechanisms are effective, then there should be a greater 
incidence of top management changes in poorly performing companies and 
improvements in firm performance following changes in management. Warner, Watts, 
and Wruck (1988) and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) document that top management 
change is inversely related to prior share price performance. Weisbach (1988) documents 
a stronger relationship between price and top management change for firms with a greater 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board. These finding are consistent with the 
boards acting as an important mechanism for disciplining poorly performing managers.  
When the internal processes for change in large corporations are too slow and 
costly to implement the required management changes, the market for corporate control 
quickly responds. Morck et al. (1989) find that takeovers tend to be directed at poorly 
performing industries. In such cases, the takeover seems to provide an efficient 
alternative to removing unresponsive managers when the board is reluctant or unable to 
remove managers. Other constraints on managerial activity, such as competition in the 
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product or managerial labour markets, may encourage managers to behave in firm value 
maximizing ways. However, when these mechanisms fail, the market for corporate 
control may serve as a “court of last resort.”  
Takeovers as a Mechanism of Managerial Control  
A great deal of theory and evidence supports the idea that takeovers address 
governance problems (Jensen, 1988; Manne, 1965; Scharfstein, 1988). The most 
important point is that takeovers typically increase the combined value of the target and 
acquiring firm, indicating that profits are expected to increase afterwards (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). Moreover, takeover targets are often poorly performing firms (Morck, 
Shleifer, &Vishny, 1988, 1989; Palepu, 1985), and their managers are removed once 
takeover succeeds. Jensen (1986, 1988) argues that takeovers can solve the free cash flow 
problem, since they usually lead to distribution of the firm’s profits to investors over 
time. Takeovers are widely interpreted as the critical corporate governance mechanism in 
the U. S., without which managerial discretion cannot be effectively controlled 
(Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; Jensen, 1993).  
The theory that underlies the functioning of the market for corporate control can 
be traced back to Manne (1965), who was the first to articulate the workings of a market 
for corporate control. Manne views the takeover as a useful mechanism for encouraging 
managers to pursue shareholder wealth maximization strategies. According to Manne, 
corporate control is a valuable asset actively traded on a market. The operation of this 
market depends upon the link between a firm's share price and the performance of its 
management. Poor performance relative to some benchmark causes a firm's share price to 
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fall below its value under efficient management, allowing a transfer of control by 
encouraging takeover bids from prospective new management teams. In fact, bringing in 
more responsible management may benefit a variety of corporate constituencies as it 
signals that the corporation will henceforth be run in a more efficient fashion (Waverman, 
1991). The nature of the bid, hostile or friendly, depends upon the expected source of 
gains from the takeover. If the takeover is primarily motivated to discipline poor 
managers, shareholders will benefit because new managers will invoke shareholder 
wealth-maximizing strategies. A second view advances the notion that gains are created 
through the various forms of synergy generated through the combination of target and 
acquirer firms. Morck et al. (as cited in Dahya & Powell, 1998) show that friendly 
takeovers are more likely to be motivated by synergy, whereas hostile takeovers are more 
likely to be aimed at disciplining poorly performing top management.  
Basically, friendly takeovers are when the bidding company's proposal receives a 
positive reaction from the target's board of directors, which in turn will go out and 
recommend the offer to the shareholders. Hostile takeovers are when the board of 
directors of the target company tries to fight off the bid and in turn will go out to the 
shareholders and recommend that they do not accept the bidder’s offer. With respect to 
the acquisition and the type of bid, management of the bidder and target would be 
affected differently. The bidding company managers may have new opportunities to 
enhance the firm's competitive advantage, operational efficiency and financial 
performance. Managers of bidding companies may also have increased job security. On 
the other hand the management of the target may find difficulties adapting to the new 
company's culture and staff. Also the managers of the target companies in acquisitions 
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may lose power and status. Theory suggests that the motivation of the acquisition will 
decide the fate of acquired company managers. A disciplinary (hostile) takeover, with the 
belief in an inefficient target management, will by definition result in a high managerial 
turnover. In contrast the acquiring management is in a far safer position. Once the 
takeover is complete, one of the evident rewards is an increase in firm size. Remuneration 
is positively linked with the size of the firm, regardless of post-acquisition performance. 
Perhaps this managerial self-interest serves as one of the main motivations in the market 
for corporate control.  
Dahya and Powell (1998) argue that many regard the threat of takeover, 
operationalized through the capital markets, as one of the key factors in maintaining good 
managerial control. Many regard this control as the single most important external factor 
in encouraging good managerial performance. Advocates of this view suggest that other 
mechanisms of managerial control, such as internal board controls, the managerial labour 
market, and product market competition, are ineffective in encouraging the efficient 
management of corporations, for example, Grossman and Hart (1980). According to 
Jensen (as cited in Dahya & Powell, 1998), when other mechanisms fail to influence 
managerial performance, the external market for corporate control comes into play and 
acts as a “court of last resort.” 
Theory of Signalling 
According to Grossman & Hart (1981), an acquirer may possess special 
information about the target company that indicates the potential value of the target 
exceeds the existing value. The acquirer can extract gains by acquiring the target and 
revising managerial decisions. Although small investors may not be able to obtain such 
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special information, investors that are in a position to be large shareholders (such as 
potential acquirers) have an incentive to develop and capitalize on the information, 
because they can extract gains on all the shares that they acquire.  
Shareholders who monitor a bid by a potential acquirer recognize that the acquirer 
possesses special information not known to the general public and tend to revise upward 
their valuation of the target. Grossman and Hart argue that the job of monitoring the firm 
will therefore be left to a potentially large shareholder, such as a prospective bidder. One 
role of a potential bidder is to discover whether a firm is being run inefficiently and, if it 
is, to take it over and replace the current management by more efficient management. 
They refer to this role as an allocational bid but state that a bidder can also extract gains 
by engaging in an acquisitional bid, whereby the bidder has special information that may 
enable the target firm to improve its performance even with its existing management. 
Grossman and Hart suggest that allocational bids are not necessarily distinguishable from 
acquisitional bids.  
Halpern (1983) supports the theory of Grossman and Hart by suggesting that the 
bidder has information about the target firm that is not available to other participants in 
the market, and not reflected in the current share price of the target. The information may 
be that the target shares are undervalued based on publicly available information or there 
are more efficient operating strategies that could be used by the target's management. 
According to Halpern, therefore, the announcement of an acquisition bid should be a 
signal to the market place and the asymmetry in information should be ameliorated.  
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Partial Corporate Acquisitions 
Partial ownership of one corporation by another allows the acquirer to exert some 
control or influence over its acquisition. In some cases the acquiring firm discloses that 
the purchase of shares is solely for investment purposes, while in other cases the 
acquiring firm indicates that an attempt to acquire control of the target firm is under 
consideration. It is obvious that the motives for acquiring shares in rival companies and 
participating in various forms of co-operation may be complex and case-specific. 
According to von der Fehr et al. (as cited in Amundsen & Bergman, 2002) three types of 
motives can be distinguished, namely:  
I. Expected synergies, for example, cost reduction through sales co-operation. All 
acquisitions are predicated on making more (profit) from two entities than they 
would make alone.  
II. Financial considerations, for example, investment of funds into other companies 
as a part of the company's management of financial assets.    
III. Learning, for example, to get information from the other company on how to deal   
with a certain production process.  
However, all of the investments represent a potentially important change in the security 
ownership structure of the target firm. 
Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find that the share prices of both the acquiring and 
the target firms increase in response to the initial disclosure of the investment position. 
Such investments initiate a process that may end with a completed takeover; a completed 
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takeover by another firm; a repurchase of the investment position by the target firm 
(target repurchase); or a sale of shares in the market or to a third party. In some cases, 
none of these outcome events follow the initial investment.  
In a passive partial ownership, a company owning a share of another company has 
no direct influence on the production decisions of that company. The company can, 
however, indirectly influence the profit of the other company (and thereby its own 
proceeds) via the price effect that its own production decisions give rise to. Hence with a 
passive ownership arrangement the capacity decisions of a company should be based not 
only on the direct effect on its own profit, but also on the indirect effect of those 
decisions on the profit of the companies in which it owns shares. It is a well established 
result that cournot oligopolists with passive equity interests in other companies act less 
competitively in the sense of reducing output and thus increasing prices (Bolle & Guth, 
1992; Bresnahan & Salop, 1986; Reynolds & Snapp, 1986).  
In an active partial ownership, an arrangement is made in which production 
decisions of the owning firm and some of its potential competitors are coordinated. This 
may take place in a situation where the firm in question possesses sufficiently large 
ownership shares in other firms to be able to exercise at least some control over their 
production decisions. It may also take place if the firm has external owners that have 
important shares in some of the other competing firms. In this case the firms involved 
may coordinate their production decisions so as to benefit their common owners. For this 
case, however, there exists no obvious equilibrium concept for co-ordination of 
production decisions (von der Fehr et al. as cited in Amundsen & Bergman, 2002).  
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The partial owner may be more effective than widely dispersed shareholders in 
monitoring the acquired firm’s management, reducing agency costs to the benefit of all 
shareholders. Alternatively, the partial owners may transfer wealth from remaining target 
shareholders by coopting the firm’s management to influence the terms of inter-corporate 
transactions in its favour. 
In a partial acquisition, transactions between the partial acquirer and target affect 
the share values of remaining target shareholders after the event. In contrast, with a 
complete takeover the relationship between the acquiring and target firm shareholders is 
terminated after the latter group receives some portion of the expected gains through 
merger premium. The complexity of inter-corporate transactions, combined with the 
random nature of stock market movements, contributes to the difficulty in determining 
their impact on the performance of partially owned firms. 
Studies of the price effects of mergers by Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976), and 
Langetieg (as cited in Madden, 1981) have found statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns to the shareholders of target firms in the months preceding the effective 
dates of completed mergers. Halpern (as cited in Madden, 1981) and Franks, Broyles, and 
Hecht (1977) found that the market began to anticipate mergers in the two or three 
months preceding the announcements. These studies have shown that the shareholders of 
the acquired firms received much larger returns than the shareholders of the acquiring 
firms. 
Franks (as cited in Madden, 1981) showed that the gains to the shareholders of 
acquired corporations in which the acquiring corporations purchased shares prior to a bid 
announcement were far smaller than the gains to the shareholders of acquired 
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corporations, which were not subject to pre-bid share purchases. This result suggests that 
the gains to merger participants are partly realized prior to any formal public 
announcement of a merger proposal. 
Studies of the price effects of tender offers by Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) 
and Dodd and Ruback (as cited in Madden, 1981) have found large positive abnormal 
returns to the shareholders of the acquired companies in the announcement months and in 
the immediately preceding months.  
Holderness and Sheehan (1985) find that firms partially acquired by raiders 
experienced significantly positive abnormal returns on the announcement of the raider's 
filing of the 13-D. Because raiders tend to be active rather than passive investors, the 
effect on the target firm can be attributed to active monitoring. Their results suggest 
investors may value the presence of a large stakeholder that is likely to serve as an active 
monitor. Spencer, Akhigbe, and Madura (1997) document that firms that had been 
partially acquired commonly engage in acquisitions and divestitures after the partial 
acquisition, and that these investment decisions affect the performance of the partial 
acquirer.  
Noting that managers of firms with widely dispersed ownership may have more 
discretion than those of firms with large minority blockholders (Berle & Means, 1932), 
“managerialism” theories (Baumol, 1959), Williamson (1964) suggest that management-
controlled firms are less profitable than their owner-controlled counterparts. A long-
standing proposition in the economic theory of organization holds that corporate 
managers, isolated from owners and shielded from the vagaries of the marketplace, 
pursue goals, which may be inconsistent with the profit-maximizing interests of the firm's 
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shareholders. The conflict of interest between owners and managers, characterized as the 
separation of ownership from control by Berle and Means (1932), is usually couched in a 
value-enhancing context: the competing goals of owners and managers misalign 
corporate interests and may result in less than optimal share price performance. Empirical 
research provides weak support for the presence of managerialism and indicates that 
minority-block shareholders do have an impact on firm performance. Substantial 
evidence documents that large stakeholders can influence a firm's financial decisions. For 
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986b), and others, suggest methods by which 
stakeholders impose influence on firms and find large shareholders can help monitor 
firms.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1980) develop models in 
which the interests of various classes of equity claimants do not coincide. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) theorize that the threat of takeover or the presence of a large minority 
shareholder may effectively discipline managers, reducing agency costs of widely 
dispersed outside ownership. The literature suggests that the dispersion of ownership 
among a large number of shareholders in large corporations will bring about the 
separation of ownership and control, providing temptation for managers to pursue their 
own interests rather than those of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that in a dispersed ownership structure individual investors will refrain from investing in 
managerial monitoring because the private costs of monitoring exceed the incremental 
benefit to the monitor. 
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The most direct way to align cash flow and control rights of outside investors is to 
concentrate share holdings. This can mean one or several investors in the firm have 
substantial minority ownership stakes, such as 10 or 20 percent. A substantial minority 
shareholder has the incentive to collect information and monitor the management, thereby 
avoiding the traditional free rider problem. He also has enough voting control to put 
pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps even to oust the management 
through a proxy fight or a takeover (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986b). In the 
more extreme cases, large shareholders have outright control of the firms and their 
management with 51 or more percent ownership. Large shareholders thus address the 
agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and 
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interests respected. The cost to 
concentrated owners of increased monitoring may be more than offset by the benefits 
they receive (Park, Nelson, & Torabzadeh, 2000).  
The actions of a partial acquirer are similar to an institutional investor that invests 
a large amount of funds in a particular firm. Like that institutional investor, the partial 
acquirer is more motivated than most individual investors to monitor the firm in which it 
has invested because it has a large stake in that firm. However, the position of the partial 
acquirer differs from the position of the institutional investor in that it may consider fully 
acquiring the firm to merge that business with its own. Thus, the future prospects of the 
partial acquirer (and therefore its value) can be affected by the financing policies of the 
firm in which it has invested. Though supporting the performance implications of 
managerialism theories, agency theory also implies a divergence of goals among outside 
and inside equity holders. Grossman and Hart’s solution to the “free-rider” problem is to 
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allow “corporate raiders” to “dilute” the claims of remaining minority shareholders after 
a takeover. The resulting increase in takeover activity would lead to a more efficient 
allocation of capital, but would also create two classes of equity claimants. 
In addition to monitoring the actions of management, corporate partial owners 
may attempt to coopt target firm managers through the implied threat of a complete 
takeover. In so doing, they may seek “intercorporate perquisites”. For example, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986b) suggest that partial corporate acquirers may advocate a high dividend 
payout policy to take advantage of the intercorporate dividend exclusion rule, thereby 
diluting the claims of other shareholders. “Product market” benefits, such as favourable 
terms for intercorporate products, fixed asset and technology sales, allocation of risk 
through research and development activities, and division of distribution channels or 
marketing activities may also be sought. Partial acquirers may also escape antitrust 
scrutiny that could be prompted by a complete takeover. 
Management literature has reported the discouraging results of many acquisitions. 
There have been widespread warnings of the erosion of shareholder value and the serious 
socio-economic costs associated with many acquisitions. In an excellent summary article 
"Do deals deliver on post merger performance?" (Note: mergers and acquisitions used 
synonymously) Alexandra Reed Lajoux and J. Fred Weston (as cited in Lynch & Lind, 
2002), argue that the longer-term effects of mergers show impairment of value (measured 
by share price and other indicators) for a variety of identifiable reasons, including 
inexperience, lack of strategic purpose, use of overvalued stock as a payment mode, and 
poor post-merger integration. The research, they argue, also shows that companies 
avoiding these traps perform better than their peers, both acquiring and non-acquiring.  
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In Mercer Management Consulting's analysis (as cited in Lynch & Lind, 2002) of 
the period 1990 to 1996, nearly half of acquisitions studied actually had a damaging 
impact on shareholder value. For example, Price Waterhouse Coopers (as cited in Lynch 
& Lind, 2002) found that two-thirds of buyers' stock dropped appreciably on 
announcement of a major acquisition, and that more than one-third of these losers still 
lagged the levels of peer companies a year later.  
Rosenstein and Rush (1990) examine the stock return performance of 51 firms, 
which had been partially held prior to and during the period from 1980 through 1984. 
They find that risk-adjusted monthly stock returns of these firms were significantly lower 
than those of matched control firms. This finding leads them to conclude that partial 
acquirers are successful in using their control to transfer wealth from the remaining target 
shareholders by influencing the terms of inter-corporate transactions in favour of the 
acquiring firms. 
Schipper and Smith (1986) examine the equity carve-out, in which a parent firm 
makes a public offering of some portion of a wholly owned subsidiary, creating the 
reverse of a partial acquisition. They find positive abnormal returns for parent firms, 
noting that virtually all other studies of the issuance of equity result in negative 
announcement date returns. 
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 Chapter Two: Research Methodology 
Data & Sample 
Partial acquisitions are reported whenever the investment results in ownership of 
at least 5 percent of the firm of concern. The partial acquisitions are identified from the 
Canadian Directories of Mergers and Acquisitions from 1993 through 1999, along with 
other information such as the number of shares purchased, price of the investment, 
method of payment used, the total amount of shares held by the partial acquirer, the four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code (SIC), status of the acquisition--completed or 
pending, domestic activity, and the initial announcement date of partial acquisitions.  
The following guidelines are used to form the sample size. First, to ensure that the 
partial acquisitions are large enough to have a discernible effect on the stock price of the 
target firm, the acquisition must represent at least 5 percent of the target’s firm 
outstanding common shares. Second, because I wish to assess partial ownership, the total 
ownership of the partial acquirer must be less than 100 percent of the target firm’s 
common shares. Third, the stock price data of the target firm must be available in the 
Toronto Stock Exchange database. Fourth, the targets in which the same acquirer 
increased its stake once or more by buying additional common shares within the period 
under consideration are excluded from the final sample. This is done in order to get a 
clear picture of the initial announcement effects on the target firm’s stock price 
performance. Fifth, only publicly traded firms are considered for the final sample. Sixth, 
the target in which the status of the acquisition is indicated as pending, that is, not 
completed, has also been excluded from the final sample size. Seventh, both the target 
and the partial acquirer must be Canadian firms. And lastly, targets in which the 
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acquisition resulted in total or completed acquisition have also been excluded from the 
final sample.  
A total of 53 firms are finally selected for this study. The sample represents firms 
from all sectors of the Canadian economy: Pipelines, Metals and Minerals, Paper and 
Forest Products, Gold and Silver, Real Estate, Industrial Products, Consumer Products, 
Oil and Gas, Financial Services, Merchandising, Communications and Media, Utilities, 
and Transportation and Environmental Services. 
Table 1 
 
Sample Characteristics 
                          Method of Payment                             SIC                   Percent Ownership 
 
                   Cash    Stock    Not Disclosed         Same     Not the Same     >50%     <50% 
 
No. of  35          13              5  38               15 4            49 
Firms 
  
Method 
To investigate the impact of partial acquisition on stock prices, the standard-event 
study methodology is used. For each firm, daily security returns are calculated for a 
period of 300 days prior to the initial announcement date through 5 days after the 
announcement date. Daily market returns, using the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 
database, are calculated for the same period. 
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The risk-adjusted average abnormal return (AARt) for each day of the event 
period t (t = - 5 to t = + 5) is calculated using the market model taken from Brown and 
Warner (1985). 
                               AARt = M1   (Rjt - ∑
=
M
j 1
α) j - β) j Rdt)                  (1) 
   where,  
          M = The number of firms. 
          Rjt = The daily rate of return for the common stock of firm j in day t. 
          Rdt = The daily rate of return for the TSE database in day t. 
     α) j β) j = The ordinary least squares estimates of the market model parameters which                  
                    are calculated over the period t = - 300 to t = - 6 relative to the         
                    announcement day, t = 0. 
The daily average abnormal returns are summed over the event period to obtain 
cumulative average daily returns (CART). The expected values of AARt and CART 
should be zero in the absence of abnormal common stock price movements. Significant 
deviations from zero are, therefore, attributable to the partial acquisition announcement. 
The observed values of AARt and CART will be tested for significant differences from 
zero using standardized t-tests. 
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The test statistics for AARt are obtained based on the average standardized return 
(ASARt), where 
                     ASARt = M1   ∑
=
M
j 1 jt
dtjjjt
S
RR )  ( βα )) −−
                            (2)  
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where is the mean daily return in the estimation period and is the residual return 
for common stock j in day t of the estimation period. The t-statistics for AARt is, 
therefore, defined as 
−
dR
∧
jtU
                     t  = tAAR 291
293M
 ASARt                                                (4) 
The t-statistics for CART is obtained by 
                          t =TCAR t
1
                                                        (5) ∑
=
T
t
AARt t
1
where T is the number of event days over which the tAAR  is summed.   
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Results 
 
             I used the standard-event methodology to investigate the impact of partial 
acquisition on the returns to target shareholders surrounding the announcements dates 
and one year subsequent to the partial acquisition. 
Overall Findings 
 
The average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 
along with their corresponding t-statistics, for the target firms are presented in Table 2. 
As shown in Table 2, the AAR for the target firms in the event-day  
t = - 2 is + 1.19 (tAAR – 2 = 2.94). The return is significantly different from zero at 
conventional level. In the event-day t = -1 the AAR for the target firms is + 2.11 percent 
(tAAR – 1 = 3.97). This return is also significantly different from zero at conventional level.  
On the announcement day t = 0, the AAR is + 12.93 percent (tAAR 0 = 14.86). The rate is 
also significantly different from zero at any conventional level. In the event-day t = + 1, 
the targets also registered a significant AAR of + 1.99 (tAAR +1 = 3.58). From the event-
day t = - 2 through t = + 1, the target shareholders realized a significant CAR of +18.22 
percent. The announcement effect is gone from event-day t = + 2. No statistically 
significant AAR is observed thereafter. Over the entire event period, the stockholders of 
the target firms realized a significant CAR of + 18.67 percent. Using the maximum and 
minimum values, I found no outliers in the data. I removed these values from the data one 
at a time to find out how their removal affects the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. The removal of the maximum and minimum values from the data did not change 
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. 
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Table 2 
 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) 
for target firms with corresponding t-statistics for the event period 
 
                    Event         AAR%          tAAR             CAR%          tCAR 
                     Day       
     
- 5 0.40264 -0.00075 0.40264 -0.00075 
- 4 0.03028 1.53442 0.43291 1.08447 
- 3      -0.18768 1.16918 0.24523 1.56049 
- 2 1.18645  2.94368* 1.43168  2.82327* 
- 1 2.11012  3.97439* 3.54180  4.30261** 
  0     12.92792 14.86477**    16.46972  9.99624** 
+ 1 1.99233  3.58281*    18.46205 10.60890** 
+ 2 0.10889 0.27646    18.57093 10.02146** 
+ 3 -0.65786    -1.29087    17.91307  9.01803** 
+ 4 0.49074 0.95253    18.40381  8.85647** 
+ 5 0.26827 0.78552    18.67207  8.68116** 
                
                     * Significant beyond .05 level. 
                   ** Significant beyond .01 level. 
   
    The average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), 
along with their corresponding t-statistics for target firms, from post announcement day t 
= + 2 to t = + 252 are presented in Table 3.  
   As shown in Table 3, the CAR remained insignificant from post announcement day 
t = + 2 to t = + 252.The CAR remained small, mostly negative over the period. The small 
positive and mostly negative values of tCAR revealed no statistically significant AAR in 
the next individual post announcement days. Over the entire period, the stockholders of 
the target firms realized an insignificant CAR of – 14.47. No outliers are found in the 
data.  
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Table 3 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) 
at selected post announcement days for target firms with corresponding t-statistics 
from t = + 2 to t = + 252 
 
              Post Announcement        AAR%      tAAR            CAR%         tCAR 
                           Day  
  
         + 2, + 25 0.02415 0.17944 2.31542 0.98573 
         + 2, + 50 -0.63250 -1.32121 2.08799 0.49103 
         + 2, + 75 0.04007  0.33101 0.89425 -0.03798 
+ 2, + 100 0.00477 -0.40645 -0.97617 -0.70972 
+ 2, + 125 -0.11528 -0.29043 -3.33784 -1.14983 
+ 2, + 150 -0.12683 -0.32853 -5.75358 -1.55659 
+ 2, + 175 0.08303  0.04360 -7.53536 -1.85591 
+ 2, + 200 0.01463 -0.06103 -9.90475 -2.17360 
+ 2, + 225 -0.10523 -0.27018  -12.01870 -2.44964 
+ 2, + 250 -0.16577 -0.38420  -14.45810 -2.71233 
+ 2, + 252 -0.05074 -0.18491  -14.46910 -2.71452 
 
       Figure 1 shows the estimated CAR from post announcement day t = + 2 to  
t = + 252. The CAR took a dive over the period. 
Regression Analyses       
           Table 4 reports the results of linear regression analysis using cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for event-day t = - 2 to t = + 1 as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 
4 reports the values of R2 and the adjusted R2 as 0.151 and 0.093 respectively.  These 
values show that there are some other variables that can be used to predict the abnormal 
returns as the variables used, only help predict a small part of the abnormal returns. Panel 
B of Table 4 reports the insignificant value (F = 2.602) of the regression analysis. Panel 
C of Table 4 shows that of the three variables analyzed (ownership percent, standard 
industrial classification (SIC) index, and method of payment), only the method of 
payment has significant coefficient. The abnormal returns are positively related to the 
method of payment (t = 2.783) used by the partial acquirer.  
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     Table 5 reports the results of the linear regression analysis using cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) for post announcement day t = + 2 through day  
t = + 252 as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 5 reports the values of R2 and 
adjusted R2 as 0.123 and 0.063 respectively. These values show that the three variables 
used in the regression analysis only help predict a small part of the abnormal returns. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the insignificant value (F = 2.049) of the regression analysis. 
Panel C of Table 5 shows that of the same three variables analyzed, only the SIC has 
significant coefficient. The abnormal returns are positively related to the SIC (t = 2.138). 
  Figure 1 
Cumulative Average Returns (CAR) at post announcement days from 
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  Table 4 
Results of Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (t = - 2 to t = + 1),  
N = 48   
  Panel A: Model Summary 
R 
 
R2 Adjusted 
R2 
Std. Error   
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R2 
Change 
F 
Change 
df 
1 
df 
2 
Sig. F 
Change 
0.388a 0.151 0.093 0.1592589 0.151 2.602 3 44 0.064 
         a.  Predictors: (Constant), SIC, Method of Payment, Ownership Percent 
 
  Panel B: ANOVAb 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F 
Statistics 
Significance Level 
Regression 0.198 3 0.066 2.602 0.064a 
  Residual 1.116 44 0.025   
  Total 1.314 47    
     a.  Predictors: (Constant), SIC, Method of Payment, Ownership Percent 
        b.  Dependent Variable: CAR 
 
 
 
  Panel C: Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Significance Level 
Method of Paymenta 0.388 2.783 0.008 
Ownership Percent 0.006 0.044 0.965 
Standard Industrial  
Classification (SIC) 
Indexb 
-0.005 -0.037 0.971 
  a. 1 if method of payment is cash; 0 otherwise. 
 b. 1 if SIC is same; 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5 
 
Results of Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (t = + 2 to t = + 252), 
N = 48 
 
 Panel A: Model Summary 
R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of the Estimate 
0.350a 0.123 0.063 0.1328023 
    a. Predictors: (Constant), Method of Payment, SIC, Ownership Percent 
 
  Panel B: ANOVAb 
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
Regression 0.108 3 3.614E-02 2.049 0.121a 
   Residual 0.776 44 1.764E-02   
   Total 0.884 47    
   a. Predictors: (Constant), SIC, Method of Payment, Ownership Percent  
   b. Dependent Variable: CAR 
 
 
  Panel C: Coefficients 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Significance Level 
Method of Paymenta 0.181 1.278 0.208 
Ownership Percent -0.087 -0.606 0.548 
Standard Industrial  
Classification (SIC) 
Indexb 
0.305 2.138 0.038 
    a. 1 if method of payment is cash; 0 otherwise. 
   b. 1 if SIC is same; 0 otherwise. 
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Discussion 
     The pattern of AARs and CARs observed are consistent with those reported by 
previous research. For example, Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (1998) report significant 
positive abnormal returns of + 1.06*, + 5.85***, and + 1.27* for event-days t = - 2, t = 0, 
and t = + 1, respectively. In this study, however, no significant positive abnormal return 
is reported in event-day t = -1. This may be due to the difference in time periods 
considered. Jabbour, Jalilvand, and Switzer (1998) used Canadian acquisitions over the 
period 1985 through 1995 to examine the abnormal returns. In reference to the U.S. 
experience, Madden (1981) report a significant positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement month and the immediately preceding month over the 22 months 
surrounding the announcement month of the acquisition. In the event-month t = -1, the 
AAR + 0.058 (tAAR – 1 = 3.096)**. On the announcement month t = 0, the AAR + 0.104 
(tAAR 0 = 5.331)**. 
Also, in reference to U.S. experience, Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) find in a 
sub-sample of firms that had been partially acquired without subsequently being 
completely taken over or divested, a negative CAR at one-year level to large negative 
abnormal returns over the thousand-trading-day period following the announcement. 
Madden (1981) finds an insignificant CAR in post announcement month 
t = + 10 after the announcements. 
 
 
  
*, ***, show significance levels of 0.05 and 0.001 respectively. 
** Null hypothesis rejected at the 0.05 level.  
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        The results of regression analysis using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)  
(t = - 2 to t = + 1) as the independent variable show that the method of payment  
(t = 2.783) used by the partial acquirer has an impact on the abnormal returns of the 
targets. The finding is consistent with prior research. For example, in an early study, 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) analyze returns to U.S. acquired firms involved in 102 
cash offers and 87 share offers over the period January 1970 to December 1978. Over the 
period (- 40, 0) days relative to the bid announcement date, firms offered cash earned a 
significant average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 33.54 percent while firms 
offered shares earned 17.47 percent. Other studies report similar results. For instance, 
Travlos (1987) finds that U.S. target firms involved in 60 share offers over the period 
1972 through 1982 earned a significant average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 
12.04 percent over the period (- 2, 0) days relative to the bid announcement date. Target 
firms in 100 cash bids earned 17.06 percent over the same event-window.  
    The results of regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (t = + 2 to t = + 
252) shows that both the method of payment (t = 1.278) and ownership percent  
(t = -0.606) have insignificant coefficients. Based on the theory of market for corporate 
control, I expected ownership percent to have a positive significant coefficient. This is 
because ownership percent will not only improve monitoring mechanisms (where control 
is not attained), but it will also enable the partial acquirers (where the control is attained) 
to replace the inefficient target management with individuals able to create value. The 
partial acquirers attain control in the target firms by owning 51 percent or more of their 
outstanding common shares. The same results, however, show that SIC (t = 2.138) is 
positively related to abnormal returns. I expected the SIC to be related to abnormal 
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returns. This is because the acquisitions involving companies in the same industry should 
enable the firms involved to gain synergistic benefits, which in turn should be reflected in 
the abnormal returns.  
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
  Several motives for takeovers have been advanced, for example, poor target 
company management and synergy. Advocates of the poor target management 
perspective, which is rooted in agency theory, claim that inefficient, self-serving 
incumbent managers who fail to maximize stockholder value will be forced out of office 
by acquirers attempting to extract such value. Literature provides strong support for the 
takeovers being of a disciplinary nature. Several studies report high top management 
turnover once the takeover has been completed. Based on this theory of market for 
corporate control, therefore, we should expect target firms stock performance to improve 
as a result of these changes in management team and or improved monitoring. The result 
one year later does not depict or reveal this. 
     Synergy is another motive offered for takeover activity. The two main types of 
synergy are operating and financial. Operating synergy refers to the efficiency gains or 
operating economies that are derived in horizontal or vertical acquisitions. One of the 
main sources of operating synergy is the cost reduction that occurs as a result of 
economies of scale-decreases in per-unit costs that result from an increase in the size or 
scale of a company’s operations.  
    Financial synergy refers to the impact of a corporate acquisition on the costs of 
capital to the firms involved. If financial synergy exists in a corporate acquisition, the 
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costs of capital should be lowered. The synergistic benefits are discussed under three 
scenarios below: 
   Scenario 1: The synergistic benefits stem from the acquirer’s resources. In this 
first scenario, I assume that opportunities to exploit synergies are associated with the 
acquirer’s resources. The acquirer uses the partial acquisition to redeploy some of its 
specialized resources in the target’s context (Barney, 1988). Therefore, we should expect 
the target’s to reflect the captured part of the synergistic gains in stock returns as a result 
of this transfer of resources of the acquirer to the target. The result one year later does not 
depict this. 
     Scenario 2: The synergistic benefits stem from both the acquirer’s and the 
target’s resources. In this second scenario, I assume that opportunities to exploit 
synergies are associated with both the acquirer’s resources and the target’s resources. 
Synergy is generated out of the joint participation of both the parties. Therefore, we 
should expect synergistic gains reflected in stock returns of the target. The result one year 
later does not reveal this. 
     Scenario 3: The synergistic benefits stem from the target’s resources. In this 
third scenario, I assume that opportunities to exploit synergies are associated with the 
target’s resources. Therefore, we should expect the partial acquirers stock returns to 
improve, thereby increasing their shareholder returns. This might be done at the cost of 
the return of target shareholders. If this happens, then, we should expect the target’s to 
have a diminishing stock return performance. This is very much possible in situations 
where the partial acquirer has obtained control in the target. In 92 percent of my sample 
size, the partial acquirers obtained control in the targets.      
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This leaves me with the following possible explanations for my results: wealth 
transfer hypothesis and semi-strong form of efficient market theory. Rosenstein and Rush 
(1990) find evidence suggesting that corporate partial owners, in general, exert control by 
coopting target firm management, transferring wealth to their own shareholders but 
diminishing the stock return performance of their partial acquisitions. 
Theory of Market Efficiency 
It is generally accepted that an efficient securities market will instantaneously 
incorporate information into security values. Thus any public information will already be 
incorporated into security values as soon as it becomes known. The only way to benefit 
from information is to keep it private or to act upon it before it becomes public. The latter 
course of action is sometimes called insider trading because it involves buying or selling 
securities based on information known by insiders of the firms that have issued the 
securities before this information becomes public. Insider trading is illegal and insider 
transactions, even if carried out legally, must be reported! 
The efficient markets hypothesis or EMH states that securities markets are 
efficient with respect to public information in the sense that no individual or organization 
can gain superior profits from using the information; this means that no one can “beat the 
market”. The notion of efficiency here is that traders move quickly and at low cost to re-
value existing securities of a firm to reflect any new information about the likely 
profitability and future dividend flow of that firm. 
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Levels of Market Efficiency 
The testing of market efficiency has been undertaken from several different points 
of view, and these became known as levels of market efficiency. Weak form efficiency is 
defined as the situation where the market was efficient with respect to all historical 
information available to participants. This information includes historical prices and 
yields on equity and debt securities. Semi-strong form efficiency is defined as the 
situation where the market was efficient with respect to all publicly available 
information, not just past price information.  The information set includes anything that 
could be known by an informed outsider of the firm from published and non-published 
sources. Strong form efficiency is defined as the situation where the market is efficient 
with respect to all information, both public and private. The information set includes all 
published and non-published information known to insiders and outsiders. 
From the efficient market theory perspective, I argue that the significant abnormal 
returns realized from event-day t = - 2 to t = - 1 are attributable to the buying pressure 
exerted by the acquiring firm or to the information associated with an increased volume 
of trading and, on event-day t = 0 to t = + 1, to the information contained in the 
announcement itself. The lack of significant abnormal returns thereafter is consistent with 
the semi-strong form of the efficient market theory. Madden (1981) finds evidence 
supporting the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
In this study, I analyzed the stock performance of Canadian firms one year 
subsequent to the announcements. Future research should investigate the returns for 
corporations that have had a corporate partial owner for several years after the 
announcements matched against a nonpartially owned control group. Such a study should 
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also investigate the difference in abnormal returns in partial acquisitions involving 
different methods of payments. The variables I used in the regression analyses helped 
predict only a small part of the abnormal returns. Future research should, therefore, 
include more variables that can be used to predict the abnormal returns.  
Conclusion 
     This study had two objectives. First, to investigate the returns to target 
shareholders surrounding the partial acquisition announcements. Second, to investigate 
the stock performance of target firms one year subsequent to the partial acquisition. A 
sample of 53 Canadian firms partially acquired by domestic firms from 1993 through 
1999 is considered for this study. 
    To investigate the impact of partial acquisition on stock prices, I used the standard-
event methodology. Consistent with finding using Canadian data, I find statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns in event-day t = - 2, on announcement day t = 0, and 
event-day t = + 1. I also find statistically significant positive abnormal return in event-day 
t = - 1. The findings are also consistent to U.S. experience for event-month t = - 1 and 
announcement month t = 0. Also, consistent with the U.S. experience is the negative 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at the end of one year subsequent to the 
announcements. 
      The regression analysis using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for event-day 
 t = - 2 to t = + 1 as the dependent variable, shows that of the three variables analyzed: 
ownership percent, standard industrial classification (SIC) index, and method of payment, 
only the method of payment has significant coefficient. The abnormal returns are 
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positively related to the method of payment (t = 2.783) used by the partial acquirer. This 
finding is also consistent with prior research. 
 The second regression analysis using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for post 
announcement day t = + 2 through day t = + 252 as the dependent variable, shows that of 
the same three variables analyzed, only the SIC has significant coefficient. The abnormal 
returns are positively related to the SIC (t = 2.138). 
          These findings suggest that partial acquisitions have positive effect on target 
shareholders returns surrounding announcement dates. The lack of significant positive 
abnormal returns thereafter suggests that the announcement does not have a positive 
impact on the stockholder returns one year later. My results one year subsequent to the 
acquisitions are inconsistent with what one should expect based on the theory of the 
market for corporate control. I therefore used the wealth transfer hypothesis and the semi-
strong form of market efficiency to try to explain my findings. According to the 
advocates of the wealth transfer hypothesis, corporate partial owners, in general, exert 
control by coopting target firm management, transferring wealth to their own 
shareholders but diminishing the stock return performance of their acquisitions. 
          From the semi-strong form of market efficiency perspective, I argue that the 
significant abnormal returns realized from event-day t = - 2 to t = - 1 are attributable to 
the buying pressure exerted by the acquiring firm or to the information associated with an 
increased volume of trading and, on event-day t = 0 to t = + 1, to the information 
contained in the announcement itself.  
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